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1. INTRODUCTION
Almost a decade ago, a major change in the risk-management industry was
in its way: J.P. Morgan, the well-known international bank, released to the general
public a detailed document describing a simple technique to measure market risks
for trading portfolios –Value at Risk (VaR) (J.P. Morgan 1995).
The document soon became an industry standard. Among other qualities,
it fully addressed the quantitative recommendations issued by the Group of Thirty
(1993), which aimed at strengthening an industry challenged by major financial
scandals (Jorion 1997). Most of the financial problems that institutions experienced
during these years were related to the lack of appropriate risk-disclosure policies
(specially in relation to derivatives), lack of involvement of senior management,
and poor internal procedures and risk-management controls.
In January 1996 the Basle Committee of Banking Supervision issued the
Market Risk Amendment (BIS 1996), which captured the major concerns of
regulators and senior management, by recommending that regulatory capital be
assigned according to market risk (in contrast to the 1988 Capital Accord, with a
focus on credit risk), and by defining a set of qualitative requirements that
incorporate the best practices for risk-management1.
All banks would be required to allocate capital to prevent balance sheet
and off-balance sheet adverse changes caused by unforeseen movements in
interest rates and market prices. For larger institutions, it also suggested that
capital should be assigned on a regular basis according to the trading portfolio’s
market risk.
As for best practices, in general terms the Amendment established the
need for ongoing improvements in risk control and risk disclosure, focusing on a
more technical measurement of market risks (daily mark-to-market of the portfolios
and measuring risks through VaR), and stressed the development of a risk-
management culture with strong involvement of senior management.
* Industrial Engineering Department, University of Chile. Independent risk-management
consultant. <mcruz@entelchile.net>.  I would like to thank Felipe Zurita for his valuable
comments, and Andrés Liberman for excellent research support. All remaining errors
are mine.
1 These best practices were previously discussed among bankers, consultants, supervisors,
and practitioners in what was known as the Group of Thirty recommendations: a set of
20 recommendations issued in 1993 for dealers and end-users of derivatives, and 4
recommendations for legislators, supervisors and regulators.
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Although the Amendment has not been fully incorporated into Chilean
regulation yet, specially in terms of the internal model requirements, many banks
have voluntarily adopted VaR calculations and other of the recommended best
practices.
This article provides a general overview of the extent to which these ideas
have penetrated the Chilean banking industry. In particular, it reports on a survey
inquiring about the current level of compliance with the best practices
recommended by international regulators and practitioners.
2. RISK-MANAGEMENT AND BEST PRACTICES IN CHILE
In order to measure the level of actual development of the risk-management
(henceforth, RM) standards in the local market, we interviewed the 17 largest
financial institutions, representing more than 95% of the total assets of the industry,
and almost 92% of its capital as of July 2003. Nine institutions were left out: two of
them local banks that just started their operations, and seven foreign branches of
international banks that have a small-sized operation in the local financial market.
The interviews were conducted between August and September 2003, and
tried to identify quantitative and qualitative adherence to RM best practices in the
banking industry. The best practices in market-RM were defined by 10 principles,
based on the Basle Market Risk Amendment recommendations (BIS 1996)2.
Each interview tried to assess the bank’s current level of compliance to
each of the 10 chosen RM principles. The level of compliance was classified in one
of the following categories: (1) There is no compliance to the RM principle; (2)
Compliance is insufficient, either because the organization is just starting to address
the issue, or because it is not yet a priority; (3) Fair compliance to the principle, but
with important issues still pending; (4) The organization is almost complying with
the principle, but minor issues are still pending; and (5) Total compliance. Loosely,
we can associate a score of 0% to (1), 25% to (2), 50% to (3), 75% to (4), and 100%
to (5).  The results of the survey are summarized in Table 1 below:
2 There is a large literature among practitioners on best practices for RM. See for
example Crouhi, Galai and Mark (2001), or Chorofas (1998), or visit www.garp.org,
and www.prmia.org for RM professional associations.
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  TABLE 1
COMPLIANCE TO RM PRINCIPLES
Principle 1: Senior management involvement in developing a risk-culture,
encouraging the implementation of best practices in RM, and helping in the
definition of an appropriate organizational form.
Only five banks were considered as complying 100% with this principle.
The rest were considered halfway or below 50%. Although the majority of them
mentioned RM as critical in their mission statement, this was not totally consistent
with the amount of time senior management spent in strategic discussions with the
head of the RM team, or with the role of senior management in promoting a cultural
change in the organization.
On the other hand, the relative relevance of the RM group inside the bank
was noticeably different between these five financial institutions and the rest, as
measured by seniority of the RM team, office space, and infrastructure, among
others.
It is important to notice that the top five banks in senior management
involvement, are also the earliest in implementing VaR in their trading portfolios.
This suggests a level of maturity of the organization in this area.
Principle 2: RM head with strong political weight in the organization,
independent (specially from the risk-taking group,) and with a clear role in
developing and enforcing risk policies.
We measured the compliance to this best practice, by asking what was the
role of the head of the RM team, who were her counterparties inside the organization,
how policies were designed and enforced, and how independent the RM group
was (specially from the treasury group).
Results turned out to be highly correlated with those of Principle 1: the
same five banks that comply 100% with Principle 2 also comply with Principle 1.
The major problem we encountered was the lack of independence between
the RM team and the treasury group. Often, the risk-manager depends functionally
on the head of the treasury. In other cases, the head of the RM unit is a junior
Principle\Category 1 2 3 4 5
0% 25% 50% 75% 100%
1 Senior management involvement 2 3 7 0 5
2 Seniority and independence 4 4 4 0 5
3 Sound measurement 2 5 3 3 4
4 Daily mark-to-market 0 2 5 0 10
5 VaR limits 0 7 3 5 2
6 Strong team 1 6 5 0 5
7 Stress testing 2 0 6 0 9
8 Backtesting 2 4 0 0 11
9 Independent auditing 0 9 2 0 6
10 Infrastructure 2 5 2 0 8
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analyst, or a mid manager.  Moreover, the strategic decision maker is often unaware
of the technical details, and shares responsibilities with other areas, such as credit
risk. In three cases, the RM area had been recently created, and its head was barely
starting the process of developing RM policies.
Principle 3: Sound conceptual risk-measurement system based on VaR,
implemented with integrity in the RM group of the bank.
We asked whether VaR was computed, and if so, what method was used to
estimate potential losses. We also asked other technical details such as the
confidence interval, the time horizon, the type of statistics, and the number of risk
factors being used.
Only two banks recognized that they were not currently performing VaR
calculations, and five banks mentioned they were in the process of implementing
a new VaR software. These were medium-size institutions or recently created banks.
The remaining banks had a VaR calculator, but their sophistication level varied
with the size of the bank, and how long had the RM team been developing this
measurement.
Most banks were computing parametric VaR, and four of them used historical
simulation as well. The number of independent risk factors in use varied from 15 to
120, although the majority used between 50 and 60. Although for a small-size
economy like Chile this might seem too large a number, it should be borne in mind
that some institutions are using fixed-income instruments as risk factors rather
than zero rates because of the lack of interest rate data. Other institutions, with
more sophisticated systems, use factors with different credit risk levels, modeling
rates and spreads independently. Furthermore, RiskMetrics works with 400 risk
factors for global markets.
The sophistication level of the risk-measurement model can still be improved
in six institutions, so that it may become an integrated tool for the RM and decision
making platforms. In particular, some of these institutions could improve by having
a more flexible calculator, while others by standardizing the set of risk reports
required by the bank. This is a learning process, where banks need to invest time
and resources to make the VaR-calculator development into an efficient risk-
communicator.
It is our impression that some banks are lagged in the learning curve, but in
general the industry is moving into the right direction, increasing the integration
of the VaR calculator with the RM process.
Principle 4: Daily mark-to-market valuation of the market-risk exposed
portfolios, and daily risk measurement.
This requirement was generally met by most banks that calculate VaR.
However, two of them mentioned that their mark-to-market frequency was monthly,
while three others defined their risk frequency as monthly. In those cases, we
assigned a 50% compliance score.
Currently available banking software in Chile provide the ability to per-
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form a daily mark-to-market of the trading portfolio. Hence, banks that are not able
to perform this operation are  technologically falling behind.
Principle 5: Risk-measurement model should be used to define limits,
allocate capital, and measure performance: risks and returns should be informed
together.
Most banks that used VaR to measure portfolio risks, were also calculat-
ing VaR limits (or would do it shortly). However, it was less common to see VaR
used in the calculation of performance measurements. This would require a more
integrated approach to RM, and therefore seems further ahead in the learning
curve.
Two banks declared that they already had, or would implement shortly,
risk-adjusted return measurements. These are the banks that have a long history
of VaR calculation, and furthermore have a very strong RM organization. Seven
banks had a trading limit established with a system different from VaR, or were in
the process of developing it. The trading limit was more often based on stop-
losses and sensitivities to particular scenarios (typically term structure perturba-
tions). The other ten banks computed VaR limits, but three of them had no particu-
lar plan regarding performance measurements. Five other banks mentioned that
they would include risk-adjusted profitability parameters in their reporting in the
future.
Overall, we see that half of this recommendation was applied: VaR limits
existed or would be implemented soon. However, the majority of the banks still did
not use the risk figures for capital allocation purposes.
Principle 6: Strong RM group, regularly updated in their knowledge
basis.
To assess the degree to which this recommendation was put into prac-
tice, we asked risk managers about their professional background, and about train-
ing courses taken by their staff. We also asked for specialized magazines or web
page subscriptions. The discussion on technical issues also allowed us to ascer-
tain, at a qualitative level, their technical ability, and we proceeded to rank  banks
accordingly.
Only at five banks we were able to discuss issues such as potential
improvements to their current parametric model, to capture all the subtleties of the
Chilean yield curves, or how to incorporate inflation risk in an explicit manner.
These five banks are the same where we saw a strong top management commit-
ment. In seven other banks the level of understanding of the technical team was
still insufficient. These persons were just being trained in VaR methods, or were
considering to do so in the near future. The remaining banks had a fair understand-
ing of the technical issues involved in VaR calculations, but were not investing in
expanding their knowledge base. For instance, only four of the seventeen banks of
our sample were subscribed to some technical publication on the subject.
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This phenomenon seems to follow the same pattern emphasized before: for
some banks –those with a large size and an important level of business–, it pays
off to transform the RM team into an investment that could even play an important
role in quantitative analysis: for example, developing more sophisticated pricing
techniques for the trading floor, or internal models for credit risk measurement. In
a sense some banks can afford to transform this “cost center” into a profit center.
Smaller or lagging institutions are not investing enough in a strong quantitative
group, or are not training their personnel beyond what is strictly necessary to
comply with regulations.
Principle 7: Banks must conduct periodic stress tests of their portfolios.
We asked whether stress analysis was performed, and under what methods.
We found that almost all banks perform some form of stress analysis, although in
the case of foreign banks, this was the consequence of head office requirements.
In other words, the art of creating stress scenarios was somehow delegated to the
international experts, although this also involves an opportunity to dialogue and
discuss about the relevant scenarios to be considered for the local markets.
 Six banks had a very simple stress test analysis, primarily based on repeating
some historical or predefined scenario. The remaining banks were more
sophisticated, spending more energy in the creation of correlated scenarios for
some variables.
In general terms, most banks that calculate VaR use some level of stress
testing, and the adequacy to this principle seems appropriate for the level of
complexity of their portfolios.
Principle 8: Banks must conduct periodic backtesting procedures.
Backtesting is necessary for the analyst to check the accuracy of the
statistical estimate for VaR.  Almost all banks that are calculating VaR are either
performing backtesting, or about to  implement it. As in the stress test case, most
banks comply.
Principle 9: Independent review of the RM and measurement processes.
When asked about these auditings, most foreign banks had a strong con-
trol on the procedures and calculations performed for RM purposes. However,
local banks –with the exception of two that had once a specific auditing
process–, did not face a formal review of the measurements other than the
regulator’s. Often local banks validated their methodologies internally, without an
independent opinion. Others found it reassuring that calculations were provided
and tested by software vendors.
Most banks were audited internally in their processes. However, it was
difficult to find a more specific RM functional auditing procedure. The revision of
risk measurements has been provided by software vendors and private consultants,
but not in a systematic manner by external, specialized, risk-auditing firms.
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Principle 10: Adequate RM infrastructure of independent and accurate
data, and integrated technology.
We focused on the procedure in use to perform calculations: Whether it
was an internal or external software, or whether it was done in spreadsheets. The
lack of good data was a problem faced by all market participants, so we excluded it
from the scores.
Seven banks did not have an adequate technology, although three of them
were at that point switching from spreadsheets to an external system. Two other
banks had developed internally systems that did not have the necessary flexibility
or performance, and were evaluating a change. The remaining banks had systems
with an adequate level of integration and consistency with the rest of the
technological platform, either developed internally or bought from third parties.
3. CONCLUSIONS
The survey conducted in mid 2003, reveals that after more than 7 years from
the date of the Market Risk Amendment publication, the Chilean Banking industry
is on average complying with 60% of the best practice recommendations.
The lowest compliance is found in Principles 2, 3 and 5, with an average
score of 51%. This reveals that the major weakness is the lack of independence
and a weak political RM organization. At the same time, although VaR is computed
in most banks, the average technical teams is still lagging on the learning curve.
Finally, RM is not yet used in the capital allocation decisions. This state of affairs
is probably the consequence of the recent adoption of VaR techniques. Most
banks declared that they had incorporated the VaR measurement three or less
years ago.
On the other side, the areas that seem to be adequately covered are 4, 7 and
8. That is, the technical basic aspects of the methodology are covered, in part due
to the fact that the local banking superintendence has been very keen on requiring
daily mark-to-market, backtesting, and stress testing. Most of the banks that do
not present a good score in these areas are in the process of implementing a
solution.
Among banks, however, the progress seems fairly unequal: although the
top five institutions have a degree of compliance of 94%, the five worst score 28%.
Moreover, the lagged banks are typically the smallest.
The major challenge in the Chilean banking industry seems to occur at the
organizational –rather than technical– level. We conclude that specially for mid-
size and small local banks, RM teams require to be empowered to make important
contributions at a strategic level.  Nevertheless, more technical issues such as
inflation risks, modeling of liquidity risks, creative generation of zero curves,
treatment of mortgage bond options, are being discussed by very few local experts.
These issues are treated either internally in the top banks, or in conjunction with
software vendors, but usually without a dialogue between practitioners.
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Lack of quality data, specially regarding interest rates, has been an important
challenge to build stronger expertise on risk analysis. At the same time we have the
strong impression that a fruitful dialogue among practitioners could be an important
step forward into the organizational and technical development of the RM
organizations.
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